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Frederick C. Luebke 
The German Ethnic Group in Brazil: 
The Ordeal of World WarP 
In April, 1917, shortly after Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with 
Germany, Brazilians of German origin or descent were victims of 
numerous, destructive riots. Although death and personal injury were 
minimal, property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences, 
business houses, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed 
by mobs gone out of control. Porto Alegre was the scene of the worst 
riots, but disturbances occurred almost simultaneously in Sao Paulo, 
Pelotas, and other cities of the South, where large numbers of German 
Brazilians lived. Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war 
against the German Empire, another series of riots resulted in more 
destruction in the German districts of Rio de Janeiro, Petr6polis, 
Curitiba, and elsewhere.2 
Like most riots, these outbursts of violence may be attributed to 
immediate causes. In this case, intergroup tension was intensified by 
genuine dismay and anger over Germany's having torpedoed Brazilian 
merchant vessels, by virulent anti-German propaganda, and by the 
rhetorical excesses of pro-Ally politicians. But that is like saying that 
World War I itself was caused in 1914 by the Serbian nationalist who 
assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The anti-
German riots in Brazil are better understood within a larger context of 
ethnic history: The behavior of the dominant Luso-Brazilians (persons of 
Portuguese language and culture) and the minority Teuto-Brazilians (as 
the Germans were often called) may be best interpreted if examined 
historically in terms of ethnic group relations, perceptions, and images.3 
Germans were among the earliest and most numerous of non-
Portuguese Europeans to settle in Brazil. Beginning in the 1820s, a small 
stream of Germans entered the country, largely as a consequence of 
vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian government. 
The number of German immigrants seldom exceeded two thousand in a 
single year. Yet after nearly a century they had multiplied and pros-
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pered until they numbered approximately 400,000 persons, mostly 
Brazilian-born and German-speaking.4 
Although colonies of German immigrants developed in several of the 
large citjes and seaports in Brazil, the majority sought new homes in 
rural regions that had been ignored or bypassed by earlier Portuguese or 
Azorean settlers. Locating chiefly in the southern states of Rio Grande 
do SuI and Santa Catarina and to a lesser extent in Parana, they built a 
new society, different from what they had known in Germany and 
different as well from that of the receiving Luso-Brazilian society. The 
Teuto-Brazilians adapted their agricultural practices to subtropical real-
ities, raised large families, and built churches, schools, and towns. They 
were the dominant group in some provincial cities, notably Sao Leo-
poldo, Blumenau, and Joinville, and became an influential minority in 
such major cities as Porto Alegre, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.s 
Because of the accidents of time and place, the Germans in Brazil had 
been allowed to develop their own society without much interference. 
By the 1880s, the last years of the Brazilian Empire, they had become a 
society within a society-a large, diverse, and structured community 
with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways. In general, they 
were well received, respected, and valued for the contributions they 
were making to Brazilian economy and culture.6 
With the advent ofthe republic in 1889, however, attitudes toward 
the Teuto-Brazilians began to change. The difference was partly a matter 
of confidence: The republic had to demonstrate its authority and its 
ability to govern, a task made more difficult by the diffusion of political 
power among the states and the development of political parties on a 
state basis. The abolition of slavery had its own repercussions as many 
thousands of new immigrants were recruited in Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal to supplement the labor supply. At the same time, the 
modernization of the economic structure of Brazil was under way, 
especially in the South. With the expansion of industry in relation to the 
production of agricultural commodities came economic and social dis-
locations that were new to Brazilian experience. As the world has 
witnessed so often in the twentieth century, modernization produced 
new social problems and tensions, especially in the cities. Some Bra-
zilians, doubting the capacity of their society to absorb the flood of 
immigrants, demanded that the newcomers learn to conform to Bra-
zilian ways.7 
A measure of nativism also invaded Brazilian thought and attitude. 
Nativism was consonant with the doctrines of the Comtean positivism 
to which many of the new republican leaders subscribed. The commit-
ment of the Brazilian positivists was not merely to progress, but also to 
order, which they understood to include a harmony among the classes, 
races, ethnic groups, and sexes. They could applaud the diverse origins 
of Brazilian society and culture and yet insist that a new unity-a 
distinctively Brazilian unity-had to be achieved, by force of dictator-
ship, if necessary.s 
During the decade before the outbreak of World War I, many 
Brazilians in all levels of society, but especially among the ruling classes, 
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began to perceive the Germans as a problem-an element that threat-
ened the equilibrium of Brazilian society. 9 The Germans seemed rich 
and powerful, socially exclusive, and unwilling to be assimilated. To the 
more suspicious, they were eager accomplices in a vast Pan-Germanic 
plot to extend the power of the German Empire and with it German 
language and culture to all parts of the world, especially the southern 
states of Brazi1.10 
The Brazilian image of the Germans, like most stereotypes, rested on 
insufficient and distorted information, rhetorical exaggeration, and 
myths.ll There was little comprehension of the diversity within the 
group, such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or 
the disparate values and behaviors that separated rural farmers from 
urban workers and businessmen, or Teuto-Brazilians from Reichs-
deutsche. Perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of the 
ethnic elite-the articulate, educated clergy, journalists, and business-
men who perpetuated immigrant culture because it served their eco-
nomic interests and satisfied their psychological needs. 
To the most ethnocentric among the German elite it seemed obvious 
that Luso-Brazilian culture was inferior to their own. They found little in 
it that they deemed worthy of adaptation or imitation. Brazilian culture 
was thought to be weak, and Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to 
combine indolence with ridiculous conceit. As for their Portuguese 
language, it seemed useful to know but unimportant in terms of world 
culture. Compared to German, they thought, it offered few literary 
treasures. 12 
At the same time, however, these same Teuto-Brazilians sought 
acceptance and recognition. They were eager to be considered an 
essential element in their adopted country's history and they wanted 
Brazilians to understand and appreciate how extensive their contribu-
tions had been to Brazil's development. Thus, the literature of Teuto-
Brazilian filiopietism describes how individual Germans had partici-
pated in the exploration of the land, the independence movement, and 
the preservation of Brazilian territorial integrity through the wars with 
Argentina and Paraguay. Moreover, they insisted that German leaders 
had helped to initiate the renewal of national intellectual life through 
their defense of liberty of conscience. Filiopietists also stressed the role 
of the Germans in placing new value and dignity on work and in 
condemning slavery as morally and socially obnoxious; they had con-
tributed significantly to the elevation of moral, cultural, and material 
standards in Brazil; and they could take credit, at least in part, for the 
emergence of the middle class in Brazil.13 
For a substantial proportion of the German sub society in Brazil, this 
kind of ethnocentric talk was pointless. Like any other immigrant group, 
the German included persons who were favorably disposed toward the 
language and culture of the host society and wanted to become a part of 
it as quickly and painlessly as possible.14 Unlike the cultural idealists 
who insisted that it was their right to maintain their immigrant speech 
and folkways and who denied the right of the government to demand 
that they learn the language of the country, such rapid assimilators were 
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eager to abandon the marks of immigrant status because they had 
become a source of social and economic deprivation. 
Between these two-the cultural chauvinists at one extreme and the 
rapid assimilators at the other-was the majority, who saw no problem 
at all. They went about their daily business gradually adapting to their 
surroundings and rarely giving the problem of assimilation any thought. 
If their assimilation was unusually slow, it was because they had further 
to go, culturally speaking, than, for example, the Italians, to whom they 
were frequently and negatively compared. Because of this cultural 
distance, they tended to cluster in separate communities. Since they 
were so numerous, they could create the institutions that maintained 
their distinctive cultural forms. Yet through daily contacts at work, in 
s~hool, at church, or at the store, they learned Portuguese more or less 
automatically. Whether they learned quickly or slowly depended upon 
individual circumstances and whether it provided good or poor oppor-
tunities for interaction with speakers of Portuguese. For most of them, 
however, the ability to speak Portuguese became the symbol of higher 
social status; it was the avenue to social and economic progress, 
especially for the young. IS 
When governmental personnel began to object to the exclusiveness 
of the rural German colonies and the slowness of the Germans to 
assimilate, as they did in the two decades preceding World War I, they 
thought first of the extreme cases-the highly isolated districts where 
there were no Portuguese-language schools and where hundreds of 
second- and third-generation children could be found whose knowledge 
of Portuguese was rudimentary at best. Similarly, when they tried to 
identify typical German attitudes, they naturally paid attention to the 
most conspicuous persons-the noisy idealists who made speeches and 
wrote editorials, ,essays, and letters demandirtg the right to maintain 
their cultural separatism. 
Thus the Luso-Brazilian majority acquired a distorted image of the 
Teuto-Brazilians. Some elements of the composite picture were correct, 
others were out of proportion, and a few were simply wrong. For 
decades in the nineteenth century, the Luso-Brazilian majority had 
ignored the question of German assimilation, probably because it had 
not seemed important enough to demand action. Then, when the failure 
of the Germans to assimilate began to be perceived as a problem, some 
Brazilian leaders tended to overreact and to press for extreme or far-
reaching measures that were intended to enforce greater conformity. 
When national rivalries exploded into world war in 1914, Luso-
Brazilian sympathies were strongly with France and her allies and their 
tolerance for the loyalty Teuto-Brazilians naturally felt for Germany was 
correspondingly reduced. Influential political and cultural leaders then 
attacked Brazil's German ethnic group as a menace to national security 
and recklessly charged them with a full range of subversive activity. The 
subsequent anti-German riots of 1917 were thUs the natural children 
born of intergroup tensions in conjunction with the accidents of world 
history. 
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The long neutrality period from 1914 to 1917 was generally a period 
of incubation for these tensions. Circumstances in Brazil were much like 
those in the United States. Germans in both countries felt a strong bond 
of loyalty to the land of their fathers; the host societies leaned toward 
the Allies. In Brazil, the Portuguese-language press quickly became a 
vehicle for intensely anti-German atrocity propaganda; the Germans in 
Brazil vigorously countered with propagandistic efforts of their own. 
The effect of this verbal conflict was to rejuvenate the German ethnic 
community and invest it with a new sense of self-esteem, if not strength. 
The German-language press thrived and voluntary organization experi-
enced new surges of vitality as they shared in the new chauvinism.16 
German ethnic behavior was not, of course, uniform. This was 
especially true of the churches. The leading Protestant denomination 
was the Evangelical Church, which was organized in several synods. 
Especially strong in Rio Grande do Sul, it claimed as members about half 
of all Teuto-Brazilians. In the nineteenth century the Evangelicals (plus 
certain Lutheran groups) developed strong institutional ties with the 
Prussian state church, from which they received most of their clergy in 
addition to significant financial support. Not surprisingly, it became a 
central doctrine among Evangelicals that German language and culture 
were inseparable from religious belief. In the neutrality period, there-
fore, Evangelical parishes and other institutions became powerful 
agents for the promotion of pro-Germanism. They raised funds for the 
German Red Cross, bought German war bonds, sponsored bazaars and 
rallies to aid German victims of war; special prayer services were held to 
implore the deity for the success of German armsY 
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Lutherans, especially those 
affiliated with the North American Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
were much less chauvinistic. Their subsidies came not from Germany 
but from the United States. Even though this church still used German 
as its basic language, it believed that a transition to Portuguese was 
essential to survival. Hence, it never offered a word of defense for 
Germany or for the preservation of Deutschtum. These Lutherans saw 
the European conflict as a judgment of God upon a sinful people-
punishment for wickedness, unbelief, failure to pray, contempt for 
God's word, and the idolatry of human wisdom as revealed especially in 
modern science and theological liberalism.18 
The German Catholics in Brazil provided a third pattern of behavior. 
That Catholicism was the religion of the vast majority of Brazilians made 
their situation fundamentally different from the Protestants. The Ger-
man Catholics were nearly as numerous as the Evangelicals but were 
much less chauvinistic. Because the Catholic church was universal and 
multiethnic, it tended to unite its German adherents with other Bra-
zilians-persons of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish origins-rather 
than to separate or isolate them from the rest of society. Even when a 
Catholic parish consisted largely of Teuto-Brazilians, it usually was not a 
ready agency for raising either money or enthusiasm for Germany's 
cause. Moreover, the preeminent German in the Brazilian Catholic 
hierarchy, Archbishop Joao Becker of Porto Alegre, was determined to 
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align his administration with the dominant attitudes and behaviors of 
Luso-Brazilian society. Nevertheless, there were individual German 
Catholics who were outspoken in their partisanship for Germany. 19 
In contrast to the churches, secular ethnic societies, especially the 
umbrella organizations, were more likely to lend themselves consis-
tently to active or vocal pro-Germanism. Brazil had no national organi-
zation like the National German-American Alliance in the United States, 
but early in 1916 a German agent, ostensibly working as a fund-raiser for 
the German Red Cross, founded the short-lived Germanischer Bund fUr 
Siid-Amerika. Widely publicized, this organization inevitably generated 
suspicion and alarm among partisans of the Allies; but even within the 
German subsociety it also earned much opposition because it repre-
sented a challenge to the established ethnic leadership, especially the 
Evangelical clergy.20 
The Germanischer Bund unintentionally stimulated the growth of 
patriotic organizations among Luso-Brazilians, the most important of 
which was the Liga pelos alliados (League for the Allies). Led by the 
brilliant Brazilian orator and statesman, Ruy Barbosa, this organization 
bore a striking resemblance to the National Security League in the 
United States. Both organizations defended the Allies, advocated pre-
paredness, protested alleged German atrocities, raised funds for the 
British and French Red Cross, and sought to hasten the assimilation of 
immigrants through educational means-literacy programs, instruction 
in the language of the host society, and in the promotion of patriotism. 
A special target of the Liga pelos alliados was Brazil's distinguished 
foreign minister, Lauro Miiller, a thoroughly assimilated second-genera-
tion Teuto-Brazilian who was finally forced out of office in May, 1917.21 
Following Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine 
warfare on February 1, 1917, anti-German propaganda was intensified 
in Brazil. It was repeatedly charged that Germany was plotting to use 
the Teuto-Brazilian colonies in the southern states as the base for its 
imperialist designs. Similarly, the German-language newspapers per-
sisted in their intense pro-Germanism, despite many ominous signs that 
Luso-Brazilian tolerance for such behavior was weakening.22 
The breaking point came on April 5, 1917, when a German sub-
marine torpedoed a small Brazilian freighter, the Parana, off the coast of 
France. Official confirmation of the sinking came on the same day the 
United States declared war on Germany.23 Brazilian newspapers storm-
ily protested the loss and demanded that the government take decisive 
action; the Liga pelos alliados urged an immediate declaration of war and 
several prominent dailies swelled the chorus.24 Patriotic rallies and 
demonstrations attracted huge crowds in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, 
Porto Alegre, and elsewhere. In several cities these demonstrations 
were transformed into ugly anti-German affairs. Allegedly impelled by 
patriotism, crowds of people surged to prominent German business 
establishments, clubhouses of German societies, and German-language 
newspapers. Despite genuine efforts of municipal governments to 
maintain order, several demonstrations degenerated into riots causing 
enormous losses due to arson and 100ting.25 
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On Saturday, April 14, and continuing through to Tuesday, April 17, 
Porto Alegre experienced the worst of these riots, as much of its German 
district was burned. Mobs consisting largely of waterfront riffraff, 
enlivened by alcoholic drink, pillaged the district. At the end of three 
days of riot, nearly three hundred buildings lay in various stages of ruin. 
Factories, warehouses, restaurants, schools, newspaper offices, plus 
many private residences were damaged or destroyed. 26 
Riots plagued other cities in Rio Grande do SuI, most notably 
Pelotas, located near the southern tip of Brazil. Although the heavily 
German state of Santa Catarina was mostly spared, other cities from 
Curitiba in Parana to Pernambuco far to the north experienced distur-
bances. Governments on all levels attempted to cope with the problem 
of civil disorder as efficiently as possible, yet in the weeks that followed, 
superpatriots continued their intolerant and inflammatory rhetoric. The 
press also continued to print, as it had before the riots, the wildest of 
rumors, including one that an army of 80,000 armed Germans were 
gathering in Santa Catarina, where the governor was Felippe Schmidt, 
another Brazilian-born German, a cousin of Lauro Miiller, the foreign 
minister. 27 
The range of reaction among the Germans of Brazil following the 
April riots was as varied as the people themselves. A few fled to the 
exclusive German colonies in the interior, but most were willing to 
accommodate their behavior to the newly narrowed standards of 
patriotic conduct. Some decided that the best course would be to make 
overt gestures of assimilation. This could be done most obviously by 
changing German names to something acceptable in Portuguese. Others 
dropped their memberships in the numerous Vereine or withdrew their 
children from the German schools. The German-language newspapers 
suspended publication for a couple of weeks, but by the end of April 
most had resumed publication, with government approval. A sharp 
division of opinion emerged regarding the proper course to follow. 
Some die-hard chauvinists were more determined than ever to maintain 
their ethnicity and to assert the justice of the German cause, but others 
advised a more moderate course. 28 Even though the majority of the 
ordinary German-speaking Brazilians had been indifferent to the war in 
Europe, many persons had now been touched by it in a frightfully direct 
way. Given the unrestrained character of the riots and the hatred they 
seemed to project, many Teuto-Brazilians wondered what would hap-
pen to them if Brazil actually declared war. 
That did not occur until another six months had passed. On October 
25, 1917, following the news that another Brazilian vessel, the Macao, 
had been torpedoed, the Brazilian president asked Congress to declare 
war, which it promptly did the following day. Nearly as promptly, 
Brazil subjected itself to another round of riots. This time Rio Grande do 
SuI remained relatively free of trouble, although this was not true of the 
city of Pelotas. Santa Catarina suffered serious disorders in Itajai and 
Florianopolis. But the worst excesses occurred in the cities farther north, 
beginning on October 28 in Curitiba, spreading to Petro polis, and 
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climaxing in Rio de Janeiro on November 3. As in April, property 
damage was extensive but there was no loss of life. 29 
Government repression of its German ethnic citizens began immedi-
ately after the declaration of war. The minister of the interior ordered an 
end to all publications in the German language, including newspapers, 
periodicals, and books, even prayer books and textbooks for teaching 
German speakers to learn Portuguese. Another decree ordered the 
closing of all German schools in which Portuguese was not the language 
of instruction. The Brazilian postal service announced that it would no 
longer handle materials printed in the German language. There were 
also injunctions against the use of German-language in public meetings, 
including worship services in the immigrant churches.30 
Congress also enacted special wartime legislation, the most signifi-
cant of which was the Lei de guerra, enacted on November 16, 1917. This 
law chiefly treated economic problems and was aimed directly at the 
great German-owned banks and coffee-exporting firms. By it the presi-
dent of the republic was empowered to seize the property of enemy 
aliens and to sell all goods consigned to them. Superpatriots in the 
Congress also demanded and received a provision granting the presi-
dent the authority to declare any part of the country to be under a state 
of siege. The next day the president announced that Rio de Janeiro and 
the southern states were in such a state of siege. Martial law was 
imposed, seven hundred German aliens were interned, and detach-
ments of the Brazilian army were billeted in the German colonies. 
Inevitably, German aliens were required to register with police; passes 
with fingerprints and photographs were issued; and mail was cen-
sored.31 
The total prohibition against any publication in the German language 
was far severer than any wartime restrictions imposed by the United 
States upon its German-speaking minority. In Brazil economic survival 
for the publishers was possible only if they switched entirely to 
Portuguese, which many of them did. Such Portuguese-language sub-
stitutes almost always were considered to be temporary expedients but 
inevitably most newspapers experienced sharp reductions in the num-
ber of their subscribers. 
Like the newspapers, the German-language schools were shut down 
immediately-267 in Santa Catarina alone. They were not allowed to 
open until they could demonstrate that they were staffed with teachers 
competent in Portuguese and that instructional materials in Portuguese 
were going to be used. 32 In the United States there was nothing 
comparable to Brazil's nationwide closure of private and parochial 
German-language schools, although German-language instruction was 
generally curtailed in the public schools. Even though enforcement was 
lax in some districts, many schools never reopened. Because public 
schools had never been established in many areas of German settle-
ment, the regulation meant that thousands of Teuto-Brazilian children 
were simply deprived of education during the war. 
It was also a difficult time for many of the German churches, 
especially in the larger towns and cities, where superpatriotic pressures 
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were felt most strongly. Inevitably, the Evangelicals suffered the most 
because of their insistence on the linkage between religion and German 
language and culture. A few congregations simply suspended all public 
functions for several months. Others tried to make the requisite transi-
tion to Portuguese. Some that were located in remote rural districts 
ignored the wartime restrictions entirely and continued undisturbed. 
Enforcement was thus inconsistent or haphazard. Higher government 
officials often tended to be tolerant and understanding, but local 
authorities were sometimes harsh and unyielding. Still other officials 
enforced the anti-German decrees only when superpatriots in a local 
community demanded it. Individual preachers and parishes endured 
harassment, but the most important general consequence of the war for 
the Evangelicals was that it cut off the source of financial support and 
the supply of well-trained clergymen. They were thus forced to become 
more independent, more self-reliant.33 
In contrast to the Evangelicals, the Catholics and the Missouri Synod 
Lutherans fared reasonably well. Again, individual clergymen and 
congregations suffered, sometimes deservedly. The Lutherans, because 
of their connections with the United States, actually prospered during 
the war, and, by all accounts, suffered no depredations during the riots, 
even though their congregations included virtually no one who was not 
German. In the numerically dominant Catholic church, the ranking 
Brazilian prelate (the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro), issued a pastoral 
letter urging understanding and tolerance of the Teuto-Brazilians, but 
the German-born archbishop of Porto Alegre, Joao Becker, imposed his 
own prohibition against the use of the German language in his diocese, 
closed all Catholic schools administered by German priests, and re-
placed parish priests of German birth. When individual German par-
ishes were attacked in the superpatriotic press, Becker failed to defend 
them, fearing the wrath of superpatriots within Brazil's ruling class, and 
earning thereby the contempt of many Teuto-Brazilian Catholics.34 
It was relatively easy for the numerous Vereine to accommodate to the 
new restrictions, compared to the churches, schools, and newspapers. 
Large numbers changed their names to something in Portuguese; some 
revised and rewrote their governing documents and opened their doors 
to persons other than Germans. Even so, most such organizations lost 
many members during the war and some simply voted themselves out 
of existence.35 
Brazil's actual participation in the war was limited. Its navy patrolled 
a part of the Atlantic but no soldiers were sent to the battlefields of 
Europe. Agricultural production was greatly stimulated, but the impact 
of war was almost imperceptible for most persons. Under such condi-
tions, the intense anti-German feelings that prevailed during the fall 
months of 1917 were bound to dissipate. Some of the severest federal 
restrictions were relaxed and a few were removed by spring, 1918, 
although the ban on publication in the German language remained in 
force through most of 1919. On the state level there was much variation. 
In Santa Catarina, for example, restrictions against German-language 
schools remained in force until 1921.36 
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After the war, the Germans of Brazil quickly returned to their old 
patterns of cultural chauvinism and self-imposed separation. German-
language schools reopened, newspapers resumed publication, German 
sermons were heard again in the churches, and the Vereine resumed 
their activities as before the war. Teuto-Brazilian businessmen and 
industrialists prospered. Nevertheless, the forces of assimilation inevita-
bly eroded ethnic consciousness in many persons. It is impossible to 
determine how many Teuto-Brazilians were absorbed into the Brazilian 
mainstream because of war-born influences. But in the isolated, rural 
colonies, bastions of German ethnicity remained intact, if not un-
touched. The cultural distance between Teuto-Brazilians and the rest of 
society, enhanced by the strong sense of German cultural superiority, 
remained much greater in Brazil than in the United States, where the 
decline of German ethnicity was almost precipitous.37 
Even though a general spirit of tolerance prevailed in Brazil in the 
postwar decade, a residue of bitterness remained. Just as some Luso-
Brazilian patriots continued to insist that national unity demanded 
programs of forced assimilation, there were Teuto-Brazilians who felt 
more disillusioned and more alienated from political life than ever 
before.38 Some newspapers, such as the Germania of Sao Paulo, re-
sumed preaching the gospel of ethnic chauvinism immediately upon 
resumption of publication in 1919. Still, this journal also insisted that 
Germans owed their Brazilian fatherland love and loyalty and that they 
had the responsibility to work for its progress and welfare.39 Neverthe-
less, the sense of resentment remained keen in many Teuto-Brazilian 
hearts. Their sense of ethnic distinctiveness had been intensified by the 
war; it was further strengthened by political unrest in the southern 
states of Brazil during the 1920s, when self-protection against revolu-
tionary bands became necessary in some communities. Taken together, 
these experiences caused many German Brazilians to be receptive to the 
siren song of Volkspolitik. When the Nazi variations on that theme were 
played in the 1930s, some Teuto-Brazilians found the music irresist-
ible.40 Given this history, it should come as no surprise that the 
programs of forced assimilation undertaken by the Brazilian govern-
ment under the Vargas regime and thereafter were more intense and 
prolonged than anything attempted during World War I. 
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